Toward a Pragmatic Model of Judicial
Decisionmaking: Why Tort Law Provides a Better
Framework than Constitutional Law for Deciding the
Issue of Medical Futility
Brent D. Lloyd*
If I were hospitalized with a bad case of the flu, I could not
rightfully demand that my attending physician prescribe antibiotics.
Antibiotics are not an effective treatment for the flu because the flu is
viral, not bacterial, and antibiotics are effective only against bacterial
infections.1 Even in the nomenclature of doctors and lawyers, the
point is a simple one: physicians have no obligation to provide
treatment deemed to be "medically futile." 2 In determining whether
a specific treatment is medically futile, physicians ask whether
providing the treatment would benefit the suffering patient.3 The
above example is a simple one because the treatment that I am
demanding would not be effective against the flu and would, therefore,
be of no benefit to me.
The question of whether a treatment is medically futile is most4
often a purely clinical one of the sort that generates little controversy.
In the above example, my physician's special competence unquestionably includes the ability to determine which medicines should be
prescribed and which withheld. Determinations of this sort are based
on clear treatment goals (e.g., recovery from the flu) and fairly certain
results (e.g., antibiotics will not aid recovery from the flu).
The same cannot be said for the kind of medical futility with
which this Comment is concerned. Indeed, as we move further from
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1. See Daniel R. Mordarski, Comment, Medical Futility: Has Ending Life Support Become
the Next "Pro-Choice/Rightto Life" Debate?, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 751, 755 (1993).
2. See Robert M. Taylor & John D. Lantos, The Politics of Medical Futility, 11 ISSUES L.
& MED. 3, 4 (1995).
3. See Mordarski, supra note 1, at 755-56.
4. See id. at 755.
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the flu scenario, the term "medical futility" acquires a nebulous new
meaning that is divorced in all but name from the clinical definition
just discussed. The following hypothetical recreates the essential facts
of In re Wanglie,5 the first case of medical futility to reach the courts.
Imagine that I am a longtime cigarette smoker of advanced years
and, as a result, I am unable to breathe without a respirator. To make
matters worse, I have suffered a stroke and am in a comatose condition
that my physician calls a permanent "vegetative state. '"6 Neurologists
at the hospital where I am being treated have informed my physician
that I am unlikely to ever regain consciousness, much less live a
normal life. My brain damage is severe, but it is unknown whether I
have any thoughts or dreams in my mechanized slumber. Always wary
of legal documents, I left no written expression of whether I would
prefer to live or die under circumstances like these. 7 Indeed, I found
the topic a touchy one, and my family and friends do not recall my
ever having expressed an opinion one way or the other. Only one
thing is certain: I will be able to live many more years with the aid of
a respirator.
Now suppose that my physician wants to terminate the respirator
treatment because she believes that the mere preservation of my
physical existence is nonbeneficial and, therefore, such treatment is
medically futile. In her opinion, the respirator is just as futile for
treating a permanent vegetative state as antibiotics are for treating the
flu. Does the fact that my life depends on its continued use preclude
her from declaring it a futile treatment?
Before we answer this question, or examine the process of
answering, let us indulge in the recitation of a few more facts. My
physician has another patient in need of a respirator for survival.
Predictably, my respirator is the only one currently available in this
under-funded facility. The other patient's likelihood of recovery is far
greater than mine. Moreover, he is younger and his brain damage is
less severe. Although comatose, he exhibits signs of awareness such as
darting eyes, suggestive of a dream state, and tears and twitches upon

5. No. PX-91-283 (P. Ct., Hennepin County, Minn. 1991), reprinted in 7 ISSUESL. & MED.
369 (1991).
6. A vegetative state is characterized by exclusively reflexive, involuntary, or unconscious
functioning in the "manner of vegetable life." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1692 (25th
ed. 1990).
7. "Nearly every state has enacted statutes authorizing the use of living wills and advanced
directives to allow patients to refuse life sustaining treatment." Neal F. Splaine, Comment, The
Incompetent Individual's Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: Legislating, Not
Litigating, A Profoundly Private Decision, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 905, 926-28 (1993).
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hearing the voices of his family. He will likely regain consciousness.
I, on the other hand, am dead to all stimuli save the tubes to which I
am vitally connected. Keeping my body alive costs thousands of
dollars each day,' but, for religious reasons, my family insists that the
treatment continue.
Things were much easier when I had the flu. While the futility
question faced there was a purely clinical one for which there was a
clear answer, the present example raises complex economic and moral
questions that are considerably less straightforward. In its most stark
formulation, the issue in the present example is whether patients in my
condition should be kept alive with costly cutting-edge technology
when doing so substantially reduces the resources available for more
It is impossible to
promising and widely accepted treatments.'
be
considered in any
can
treatment
life-sustaining
a
determine whether
sense nonbeneficial without at least a partial answer to the moral,
Because there is no
ethical, and economic questions involved."
common law or statutory authority on these questions, the physician
in the hypothetical above is left to her own devices in deciding whether
my respirator treatment is futile or beneficial and, hence, whether she
has the duty to make this treatment available.
Recognizing that courts will eventually have to confront the issue
of medical futility," this Comment argues that there is no principled
basis for omitting these difficult questions from a legal analysis of the
issue and that courts should therefore decide the issue in a manner that
honestly confronts them. Specifically, the argument advanced here is
that courts confronted with cases of medical futility should decide the
issue under principles of tort law, rather than under principles of
constitutional law. The crux of this argument is that tort principles
provide an open-ended analytical framework conducive to considering
troublesome questions like those raised by the respirator scenario, while
constitutional principles provide a framework that is conducive to
avoiding those questions.
This argument is presented in three parts. Part I provides a
general overview of medical futility. Part II describes two opposing

8. See Robert J. Dzielak, Physicians Lose the Tug of War to Pull the Plug: The DebateAbout
Continued Futile Medical Care, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 733, 760 (1995).
9. Cf. Mark A. Bonanno, The Case of Baby K: Exploring the Concept of Medical Futility,
4 ANNALs HEALTH L. 151, 172 (1995) ("The issues are dying and who should control the
decision of how and when death will occur.").
10. Cf. Taylor & Lantos, supra note 2, at 10. ("[T]he illusion that futility and rationing
are entirely distinct can no longer be maintained.").
11. Bonanno, supra note 9, at 160.
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methods of deciding cases-formalism and pragmatism-and shows
why the issue of medical futility should be approached pragmatically.
Finally, Part III argues that tort law provides a pragmatic model of
decisionmaking better suited to deciding issues of medical futility than
the formalistic model often used in constitutional decisions of similarly
volatile issues.
I.

MEDICAL FUTILITY

The background material presented below is divided into four
subparts. Subpart A explains the four ways in which the concept of
medical futility is used in contemporary health care, paying particular
attention to the type of futility at issue in the respirator scenario.
Subpart B discusses how the four concepts of medical futility evolved
in response to recent economic incentives to limit life-sustaining
treatments. Subpart C reviews the debate over the use of medical
futility as a rationale for terminating or withholding treatment in cases
such as the respirator scenario. Finally, subpart D discusses the
unsettled legal status of this difficult and multi-faceted issue.
A.

The Contemporary Concept of Medical Futility

The term "medical futility" has several acceptable synonyms but
no real definition. It refers generally to a "physician's conclusion that
a therapy will be of no value to the patient and should not be
prescribed."' 2 As a limitation on the physician's duty to a patient,
the notion that a physician has no duty to provide futile treatment is
grounded in settled principles of negligence law. 3 Despite its familiar
foundation, however, the concept of medical futility has never been
explicitly relied upon in judicial decisions14 or defined by statute.' s
This lack of authority leaves physicians free to define what
constitutes futile treatment on a case-by-case basis.'6 As a result, the
concept of medical futility has a confusing array of meanings derived
from varied clinical contexts. Despite this definitional confusion, it is

12. Mordarski, supra note 1, at 755 (quoting Steven H. Miles, Medical Futility 1 (Jan. 11,
1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Cleveland State Law Review)).
13. See Bonanno, supra note 9, at 166. This observation is based on the fact that the
physician's duty of care is governed by the standard of reasonableness and the principle that truly
futile care is per se unreasonable.
14. As shown in Part I, subpart D, the two leading cases of medical futility strain to avoid
the merits of the issue. See Dzielak, supra note 8, at 755.
1S. Bonanno, supra note 9, at 158 (noting the absence of statutory guidelines on medical
futility "other than state-level 'do not resuscitate order' or 'advance medical directive' legislation").
16. Id.
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clear that, as a means of limiting expenditures, medical futility is
becoming increasingly important in contemporary health care.17 The
discussion below identifies four distinct applications of the concept of
medical futility.
1. Physiological Futility
A treatment is physiologically futile when it "is clearly futile in
achieving its physiological objective and so offers no physical benefit
to the patient."1 " In the flu scenario, for example, my physician
refused to prescribe antibiotics because doing so would not aid my
recovery from the flu. As a rationale for withholding treatment,
physiological futility is less troublesome than the "nonbeneficial
treatment" rationale invoked in the respirator scenario. 9 Unlike this
more extreme version of medical futility, physiological futility raises
purely medical questions informed by clear treatment goals.20
2. Nonbeneficial Futility
The current debate owes most of its fervor to the frequent use of
medical futility as a rationale for withholding or terminating lifesustaining treatments that are considered "nonbeneficial. '21 Although
this version of medical futility recognizes that life-sustaining treatment
may provide important physical benefits, it justifies withholding such
treatment on the ground that the treatment is "nonbeneficial" in a
holistic sense.2 2 Consider the following example:
A patient in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) who has renal
failure will receive physiological benefit from dialysis treatments.
However, these dialysis treatments will be non-beneficial to the
patient as a person since the treatment will serve only to keep the
biological organism alive and not ameliorate
the cause of the PVS,
23
nor enable him to regain consciousness.
This is essentially the same argument advanced by my physician in the
respirator scenario. Its validity depends on the troublesome question
of whether life-sustaining treatment can ever be considered non-

17. See id. at 158-60.
18. Mordarski, supra note 1, at 755 (quoting R.D. Truog et al., The Problem with Futility,
326 N. ENG. J. MED. 1560 (1992)).
19. See id. at 755-56.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 758.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 755-56 (citations omitted).
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beneficial when the patient or the patient's family has expressed the
contrary opinion.
A common objection to this type of futility is that it disguises
value judgments about quality of life in the language of medical
certainties.24 The nonbeneficial treatment rationale is often used by
physicians to write "do not resuscitate" (DNR) orders, withholding
CPR from patients who are unlikely to live long enough to be
In those cases, the conclusion that
discharged from the hospital.2
CPR is a nonbeneficial treatment is based on the fact that it buys the
patient very little time. This kind of reasoning is problematic because
it ignores more qualitative concerns: time acquired by virtue of CPR
gives patients the chance to say good-bye to family and friends, to
settle financial matters, or merely to live a little longer.26 Even the
shortest periods of added life may be of significant value to some
patients.
3.

Cost-Benefit Futility

Medical futility is used in a third sense to describe treatments that
"are very unlikely to produce a desired physiologic or personal
benefit."27 Consider the example of a brain scan used to rule out the
marginal possibility of brain cancer in a patient who suffers from
tension headaches.2 The use of a brain scan in this type of case is
said to constitute futile treatment because the probability that the
patient actually has cancer is extremely low.29 Precisely how low this
probability must be to justify withholding treatment, however, is
arguably more a question of policy than medicine.
4. Cost-Probative Futility
The fourth clinical use of medical futility refers to nonvalidated
treatments that show substantial promise. 3' This type of futility
differs from the others because decisions to withhold nonvalidated
treatments are made by third-party insurance carriers instead of
physicians.31 Even treatments deemed beneficial by physicians can

24. Id. at 758-59.
25. Id. at 759-60.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 756 (quoting Steven H. Miles, Medical Futility 2 (Jan. 11, 1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Cleveland State Law Review)).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 757.
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be withheld under this version of futility.32 This withholding is
justified because of the additional expenses incurred with respect to
nonvalidated treatments. These expenses exist because such treatments
have not been thoroughly tested or have proven to be largely unsuccessful. 3 Insurance carriers will, therefore, refuse to pay for these
nonvalidated treatments.34 Decisions to withhold treatments under
this rationale reflect purely financial, as opposed to medical, considerations.
From Humble Beginnings: The Conceptual
Evolution of Medical Futility
The concept of medical futility did not always cover so much
ground. Before a case like the respirator scenario was even conceivable,
the term "medical futility" was used innocuously to describe "an area
The discussion in subpart 1 below
requiring further research." 3
describes the process by which this rather inane concept grew into the
expansive forms of futility just discussed. Subpart 2 explains the
financial incentives that encouraged this growth.
B.

1. The Conceptual Expansion of Medical Futility
The four disparate forms of medical futility discussed above
originated in the 1980s with the publication of several articles that
documented the general ineffectiveness of CPR in specific patient
groups.36 In 1983, physician-commentator Dr. Susanna E. Bedell
concluded that the low rate of "survival-to-discharge" for these groups
reflected the serious limitations of CPR." This line of argument was
taken to its next logical step in 1987, when it was finally concluded
that "[o]ffering CPR to [these patient groups] represented bad faith
because doing so implied a potential for benefit when there was
none." 38 This argument is the genesis of the current "nonbeneficial"
concept of medical futility discussed above.39

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Taylor & Lantos, supra note 2, at 5.
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing Susanna E. Bedell et al., Survival After CardiopulmonaryResuscitation in the
Hospital, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 569, 575 (1983)).
38. Id. at 6 (quoting Leslie J. Blackhall, Must We Always Use CPR?, 317 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1281, 1284 (1987)).
39. Id.
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Unlike the original use of the term that merely described the need
for further research, the more expansive view of medical futility
distilled from Dr. Leslie J. Blackhall's work provides actual justification for terminating or withholding any treatment so long as its
burdens are deemed to outweigh its benefits." The groundbreaking
stature of this new concept of futility is apparent from the fact that,
just ten years before the publication of Blackhall's work on CPR, the
medical community had uniformly opposed the termination of lifesustaining treatments in all circumstances.4" Under the pressure of
changing financial realities, however, physicians were quick to adopt
the new futility rationale.42 Marching to the beat of Blackhall's drum,
physicians began identifying situations in which "unilateral, physicianinitiated treatment limitation policies" could be justified on futility
grounds.43
Today, medical futility is often invoked to justify the termination
and withholding of life-sustaining treatments when the burdens (i.e.,
the cost of treatment) are deemed to far outweigh the benefits (i.e., the
resulting quality of life). 4
2. From Cost-Based Reimbursement to Managed Care: The
Economic Incentive for Expanding the Concept of Medical Futility
Hard financial realities encouraged the conceptual expansion of
medical futility and are directly responsible for the increasingly
important role the new concept plays in treatment limitation policies." Shielded from the financial consequences of unlimited treatment expenditures by a system of cost-based reimbursement, physicians involved in the right-to-die litigation of the late 1970s asserted
that the duty of care physicians owe to their patients required them to
take whatever steps were necessary to preserve the lives of their
46
patients.
The transformation of health care financing from cost-based
reimbursement to managed care, however, provided for the first time
an economic incentive sufficient to overcome deeply rooted hesitations
about limiting the use of life-sustaining treatments.47 Although

40. Id.at 9.
41.

Id.at 6-7.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at

6.
9.
7.
6.
7.
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health care costs had been rising faster than the rate of inflation for
decades, the traditional "fee-for-service" payment system continued to
reward providers for those increasing costs well into the 1980s.48 The
stark reality of limited resources became harder to ignore as the nation
moved toward "prospective payment" systems, which shifted substantial costs from third-party insurance carriers to health care providers. 49 This changing economic landscape provided the necessary
incentive to begin seriously discussing the possibility of rationing lifesustaining technology in accordance with cost-benefit criteria.
C. Opposing Views on Medical Futility: A Review
of the Current Debate
The debate over medical futility is about whether physicians
should be required to honor the wishes of patients and family members
regarding the use of life-sustaining treatment, even when doing so
would offend the physician's professional judgment that providing such
treatment is futile. The central policy arguments advanced in the
debate over medical futility are reviewed below.
1. Arguments Against the Use of Medical Futility as a Justification
for Restricting the Use of Life-Sustaining Treatments
While the term "medical futility" suggests a scientific question
(i.e., a medical question) with clear and certain results (i.e., futility),
the foregoing discussion has shown that neither connotation is accurate.
In referring to justifications for restricting the use of life-sustaining
treatments, it would perhaps be more accurate to use a different
term.50 In cases where physicians seek to terminate or withhold lifesustaining treatments, some argue that the question is really more
moral and economic than medical, and our attempts to answer it are
too interwoven with "questions of values" to be properly characterized
as determinations of "futility."'"
Use of the term "medical futility" as a synonym for "economically
inappropriate," it is argued, signals a dangerous expansion of the
concept that threatens to damage physician integrity and subvert
"attempts to develop ethically defensible systems for allocating scarce
medical resources. 5 s2 Even among commentators who acknowledge

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 10.
Mordarski, supra note 1, at 758-59.
See Taylor & Lantos, supra note 2, at 12.
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a need for "some kind of rationing" in cases like the respirator
scenario, serious questions exist about the propriety of using the
nebulous "beneficial treatment" standard as the touchstone for life-anddeath treatment decisions.13 Treating these difficult policy decisions
as purely medical decisions is, for some critics, a subterfuge meant to
disguise "the inevitable tragic choices that result from limited
resources. "54
Arguments in Support of Using Medical Futility as a Justification for Restricting the Use of Life-Sustaining Treatments
Proponents of "economically inappropriate" and "nonbeneficial"
futility are far more concerned with the health care crisis that gave rise
to .the concept of medical futility than with definitional difficulties
pointed out in the law reviews. While occasionally acknowledging that
a more precise definition is desirable, 5 proponents of the new medical
futility defend these admittedly "somewhat fuzzy" 56 formulations by
referring to such realities as increased life expectancy and increasingly
frequent calls for universal coverage.57 The concept of medical
futility provides, in their view, a necessary means of limiting the most
extreme expenditures according to a neutral assessment of benefits and
burdens.5 "
The chief proponent of medical futility, Dr. Steven Miles, is the
physician who recommended termination of the ventilator treatment in
In re Wanglie, the case upon which the respirator scenario is based. In
making this recommendation, Dr. Miles believed that an "ethic of
,stewardship''' required him to balance the treatment's benefits to Mrs.
Wanglie with its burdens to other members of the insurance pool. 9
Dr. Miles is critical of those who complain disparagingly about the
subjectivity inherent in distinguishing the "beneficial" from the
"nonbeneficial," arguing that
2.

53. See, e.g., id. at 10-12.
54. Id. at 11-12.
55. See Dzielak, supra note 8, at 760.
56. Steven Miles, Futility and Medical Professionalism, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 873, 881
(1995).
57. Taylor & Lantos, supranote 2,at 10 ("It is inevitable, though rarely acknowledged, that
some form of rationing will ultimately be necessary if we are to be able to afford universal health
care.").

58. See Miles, supra note 56, at 880 (arguing that "a discretionary and prudential clinical
authority to use medical futility is likely to be a social policy that on balance protects individuals
from the arbitrary exercise of power").
59. Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand for "Non-beneficial" Medical Treatment, 325 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 512, 514 (1991) [hereinafter Miles, Informed Demand].
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[i]t is an elite, academic sophistry (not practical, serious, civic, moral
reflection) to equate years of respirator support for an anencephalic
baby, cryogenic suspension of a person with untreatable pancreas
cancer, or years of intensive care for an eighty-seven year old permanently unconscious, respirator dependent woman with the decisions
about ordinary access to penicillin, vaccinations, or appendectomies,
which are routinely used and widely recognized as beneficial.60
A "common sense of the purpose and good of health care" provides,
according to Dr. Miles, a non-arbitrary basis for distinction, which
critics are wrong to dismiss as overly subjective. 6
Judges and legislatures are anything but eager to pit this utilitarian
perspective against the more idealistic one voiced by opponents.
Indeed, society as a whole appears reluctant to address the difficult
questions raised by cases like the respirator scenario. Thus, it is not
surprising that the law in this area is wholly unclear.
D.

The Legal Status of Medical Futility: An Open Question
In cases involving the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments, no
court has ever specifically decided whether physicians may unilaterally
determine that a life-sustaining treatment is futile and, hence, outside
the scope of the physician's duty to render reasonable care. Despite an
abundance of seemingly relevant authority, the issue of medical futility
has no precedent.
While the respirator scenario inevitably brings to mind right-todie cases, the legal principles articulated there have little relevance to
the issue of medical futility. 62 Ironically, the same is true of In re
Wanglie63 and In re Baby K, 64 two cases in which the issue of medical futility actually came before a court. In examining these two cases,
the discussion below focuses on how each court strained to avoid
confronting the futility issue.

60. Miles, supra note 56, at 880.
61. See id.
62. The issue in right-to-die cases is the exact opposite of the issue in cases of medical
futility. While the right to die requires physicians not to preserve a patient's life where he or she
refuses treatment, cases of medical futility raise the issue of whether physicians should be required
to provide life-sustaining treatment if the patient or patient's family insist that this be done. See,
e.g., Mordarski, supra note 1, at 761.
63. No. PX-91-283 (P. Ct., Hennepin County, Minn. 1991) reprinted in 7 IssUES L. &
MED. 369 (1991).
64. 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
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1. In re Wanglie
In re Wanglie (Wanglie) is the 1990 seminal case of medical
futility on which the respirator scenario is based. Although the case
sparked a national debate over physician-initiated treatment limitations,
in probate, so consideration of the futility
the dispute was resolved
65
issue was unnecessary.
In Wanglie, health care providers at Minnesota General Hospital
sought to terminate life-sustaining treatment for an elderly woman
whose family demanded its continuation.66 The patient, Mrs. Helga
Wanglie, had suffered severe oxygen deprivation as a result of a heart
attack, but remained physically alive in a permanent vegetative state.67
Dr. Steven Miles, one of Mrs. Wanglie's physicians at the time, argued
that providing life-sustaining treatment was futile because she had what
was believed to be a negligible chance of recovery.6" Mrs. Wanglie's
family insisted that treatment continue on grounds of religious faith
and a desire to "hope for the best."'6 9
The hospital devised a two-step process to settle its conflict with
the Wanglie family. First, it petitioned the Minnesota Probate Court
to appoint an independent guardian charged with determining the
propriety of continued treatment for Mrs. Wanglie. 7 ° Second, it
agreed with the Wanglie family that if the guardian decided against
continued treatment, a hearing would be held to determine whether the
hospital had a legal duty to provide continued treatment.7'
This last step proved unnecessary, however, because the probate
court appointed Mrs. Wanglie's husband as guardian.72 Disregarding
contrary provisions of Minnesota law, 73 the court justified its appointment of Mr. Wanglie, stating that he was the one most qualified to

65. Mordarski, supra note 1, at 763-64 (citing Ronald E. Cranford, Helga Wanglie's
Ventilator, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 23).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Miles, Informed Demand, supra note 59, at 513.
69. Ronald E. Cranford, Helga Wanglie's Ventilator, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug.
1991, at 23.
70. Mordarski, supra note 1, at 764.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Dzielak, supra note 8, at 752. Dzielak argues that, by appointing Mr. Wanglie as
guardian, the court disregarded Minnesota's guardianship statute, Minn. Stat. § 144.651 (12)
(Supp. 1989), which recognizes "that continued medical treatment does not always serve a
patient's best interests." Dzielak, supra note 8, at 752 (quoting In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332,
339 (Minn. 1984)).
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determine and protect his wife's best interests.74 In that capacity, Mr.
75
Wanglie demanded that his wife receive continued treatment.
Having resolved the dispute in probate, it was unnecessary for the
Wanglie court to address the competing contentions of the parties
about medical futility.
2. In re Baby K
In In re Baby K (Baby K), the mother of an infant born with
anencephally 76 demanded that the hospital provide mechanical
ventilation when her baby had difficulty breathing.77 The hospital
argued that such treatment "would serve no therapeutic or palliative
purpose" for Baby K, who, because of her condition, possessed no
cognitive ability and was unable to see, hear, or feel pain.78 Indeed,
it was expected from the beginning that Baby K would die before the
conclusion of the dispute.79
Because of its disagreement with Baby K's mother, the hospital
tried to find another treatment facility that would accept Baby K."0
However, when it became clear that no area facility was willing to
assume such a costly treatment obligation, the hospital filed an action
to determine whether it had a duty to provide emergency medical
treatment that the hospital considered medically and ethically
inappropriate."1
Like the Wanglie court, the court in Baby K never had to address
the substantive question of medical futility. Applying a widely
criticized construction of the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA), the court reasoned that the hospital
had to provide a ventilator because the breathing difficulty experienced
82
by Baby K was an emergency medical condition under the statute.
74. Miles, Informed Demand, supra note 59, at 513.
75. Id.
76. In the words of the court:
Anencephally is a congenital defect in which the brain stem is present but the cerebral
cortex is rudimentary or absent. There is no treatment that will cure, correct, or
ameliorate anencephally. Baby K is permanently unconscious and cannot hear or see.
Lacking a cerebral function, Baby K does not feel pain.
In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert.,
denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Bonanno, supra note 9, at 164.
81. Id. at 161 (The hospital sought a declaratory judgment as to its duty to render medical
care to Baby K.).
82. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596.
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The decision in Baby K is often faulted for ignoring legislative intent
to limit the scope of the EMTALA to cases in which patients are
denied emergency room treatment for lack of adequate insurance
coverage or personal resources." In this case, the hospital did not
seek to deny treatment because Baby K lacked funds, but because her
life expectancy was only a few days and the hospital believed that no
available treatment could increase her quality of life.84

II.

How JUDGES DECIDE CASES

Despite their inevitable inaccuracies, stereotypes provide a helpful
frame of reference for distinguishing between formalism and pragmatism, the two opposing methods of judicial decisionmaking discussed
below. In American jurisprudence, the Formalist is perhaps best
symbolized by the archetypal black-robed judge who carefully balances
the scales of justice by "blinding" himself to nontextual, nondoctrinal
policy concerns that are best left to the legislature. The Pragmatist,
though less amenable to symbolization, can be thought of as the tweedsuited intellectual whose schooling in modern philosophy has convinced him or her that law and public policy cannot honestly be
separated. Although these opposing images of the American judge
reflect differences of opinion regarding the proper role of the courts,
they also reflect more abstract differences concerning the limitations of
logical reasoning.
In examining these disparate approaches, the discussion below
provides the theoretical foundation necessary to show how tort law
provides a better basis than constitutional law for deciding the issue of
medical futility. This discussion has three subparts. Subpart A
examines legal formalism, a method of judicial decisionmaking defined
by its use of syllogistic reasoning. Subpart B examines legal pragmatism, an alternative to formalism which, as shown by example, differs
from formalism by relying explicitly on inductive reasoning and policy
analysis. Finally, subpart C explores the limits of legal formalism with
respect to particular types of cases. This discussion is relied upon in
Part III to show how using constitutional law to decide issues such as
medical futility facilitates and encourages formalistic decisionmaking
that avoids difficult social issues, while the use of tort law, by contrast,

83. See,
K, 16 F.3d at
84. See,
K, 16 F.3d at

e.g., Bonanno, supra note 9, at 167; Dzielak, supra note 8, at 756-57; In re Baby
598 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
e.g., Bonanno, supra note 9, at 167; Dzielak, supra note 8, at 756-57; In re Baby
598 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
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encourages and facilitates pragmatic decisionmaking and, ultimately,
useful decisions that discuss the true bases for opinions.
A.

Legal Formalism

Legal formalism is defined, for purposes of this Comment, as the
use of syllogistic reasoning in judicial decisionmaking." The following discussion reviews the basic rules of syllogistic reasoning and
provides an example of its use in judicial decisionmaking.
1. Syllogistic Reasoning
As a form of deduction, syllogistic reasoning "draws out the
implications of knowledge we already possess."8 6 A syllogism has two
premises (stated as "categorical sentences") and a conclusion.8 7 By
convention, the first premise, called the "major premise," contains the
predicate of the conclusion, while the second premise, called the
"minor premise," contains the subject of the conclusion."8
It is important to distinguish truth from validity. A syllogism is
valid if the conclusion flows from the premises.89 The validity of a
syllogism, however, does not guarantee the truth of its conclusion.
The conclusion of a valid syllogism is true only if, in addition, each
premise is true." In a valid syllogism, the truth of the two premises
guarantees the truth of the conclusion.9' Consider the following
example:
P1
P2
C

No Marxist advocates private property.
All conservatives advocate private
property.
92
No conservative is a Marxist.

This syllogism is valid because the conclusion flows from the premises.
However, its validity does not guarantee the truth of its premises.
What its validity does guarantee is that the truth of the conclusion
cannot be denied if the truth of each premise is accepted. 3 Unlike
85. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudenceof Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 831 (1988).
86. DAVID KELLEY, THE ART OF REASONING WITH SYMBOLIC LOGIC 167 (1990).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 194.
89. Posner, supra note 85, at 833.
90. Id.
91. KELLEY, supra note 86, at 198.
92. Id. at 195.
93. "A valid argument can have false premises and/or a false conclusion. And an argument
whose premises and conclusion are all true can nevertheless be invalid. The relationship between
validity and truth is that a valid syllogism cannot have true premises and a false conclusion." Id.
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"truth," which is determined with reference to "facts we already
know," validity depends solely upon the "internal coherence of the
argument" (i.e., the logical relevance of the premises to the conclusion). 94 The persuasive power of a valid syllogism is the fact that if
the premises are true, the conclusion must necessarily be true as
well."5
2.

Legal Formalism Applied

Syllogistic arguments in law utilize the structure just outlined.
The major premise in a legal syllogism contains the operative legal rule
(e.g., "No contract is enforceable without consideration."), while the
of that rule (e.g., "The contract
minor premise contains the application
6
in suit has no consideration.").
Imagine a dispute involving a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Fed.
R. Civ. P.) 12(b)(6). w Assume that the defendant had previously
filed a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process and moves
for a 12(b)(6) dismissal in her answer. In determining whether the
defendant waived her 12(b)(6) claim by not raising it in her first
motion, the judge would first look to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2), which
provides that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim can be
made "in any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7(a)."
Turning, as directed, to Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a), the judge would then
discover that an answer is indeed an "ordered pleading."
Though a judicial opinion in this case would invariably lack the
virtue of brevity, it would still look something like the following:
1.
2.
3.

All motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are
permissible if permitted or ordered under Rule 7(a).
All answers are ordered pleadings under Rule 7(a).
Therefore, all answers are pleadings that may properly
contain a motion to dismiss."

The judge would therefore hold that the defendant may properly raise
a 12(b)(6) motion in her answer.

at 198.
94. Id. at 94.
95. See Posner, supra note 85, at 833.
96. Id. at 831.
97. This example is taken from JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES
AND EXPLANATIONS 281-84 (2d ed. 1992).
98. See id.
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From a rhetorical perspective, this example highlights the
graphic form of syllogistic reasoning.9 The judge's holding seems
indisputable because it appears in the first premise, which is a partial
definition of the class of pleadings-those "ordered or permitted under
Rule 7(a)"-in which a 12(b)(6) motion can be raised. Thus, we are
convinced beyond doubt that any pleading taken from this class may,
by definition, properly contain a motion to dismiss. Having established this, the second premise goes on to say, in effect, that all
pleadings within this class have labels and that "answer" is one of
those labels. As a result, when we remove our defendant's answer
from this class, we know that it can properly contain a motion to
dismiss: the only pleadings in this class bearing the label "answer" are
those in which a 12(b)(6) motion can always be raised. The syllogistic
structure of the opinion is assuring in that it leaves the impression that
we are doing nothing more than "taking out what we put in." 100
B. Legal Pragmatism
The term "pragmatism," as used in this Comment, refers to
the method of judicial decisionmaking advocated by the Practical Legal
Studies (PLS) movement, the practitioners of which are hereinafter
referred to as "Pragmatists." The following discussion reviews the
jurisprudential philosophy of the PLS movement and provides an
example of the pragmatic method of deciding cases.
1. Practical Legal Studies
The PLS movement shares with its older cousin, Critical Legal
Studies (CLS), certain core beliefs about the inherent limitations of
using syllogistic reasoning to decide particular kinds of cases.' Like
the CLS practitioners, or "Crits," Pragmatists reject "foundationalism"-legal theories that "posit one critical value and deduce 'right'
answers to all cases from it"-as a legitimate method of legal reasoning. 0 2 Unlike the Crits, however, Pragmatists resist the conclusion
that legal reasoning is, therefore, an indeterminate and angst-ridden

99. Posner, supra note 85, at 830-31. The discussion in this paragraph borrows from
Posner's graphic account of the persuasive power of syllogistic reasoning.
100. Id. at 831.
DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
101.
CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 125 (1993).

102.

Id

LAW:

THEMES FOR THE
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Instead, Pragmatists argue

that
the complex "web of beliefs" in the legal interpretive community,
if approached with an open mind and a sensitivity to the situation
under litigation, provide both a constraining influence (lessening the
fear of tyranny by the judiciary) and a way to liberate us from a
tyranny by the majority." 4

No longer searching for "the right answer" promised by foundationalist
theories, Pragmatists look instead for the "best answer available. '
The PLS approach to judicial decisionmaking contradicts the
formalist conception of legal reasoning as a distinct, policy-neutral
form of deductive reasoning."0 6 It represents an "eclectic-but by no
means unfamiliar-methodolog[y]," which Pragmatists call "practical
reason."'0 7 Included in this "grab bag" methodology are
anecdote, introspection, imagination, common sense, intuition (due
apparently to how the brain structures perceptions, so that, for
example, we ascribe causal significance to acts without being able to
observe - we never do observe - causality), empathy, imputation of
motives, speaker's authority, metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom,
memory, "induction" (the expectation of regularities, related both to
intuition and analogy), [and] "experience."1'08

Such a broad litany of nonlegal concerns may appear too subjective to
form the proper basis of judicial, as opposed to legislative, decisionmaking. Pragmatists argue, however, that this type of reasoning offers
a "non-arbitrary" means of deciding cases'0 9 subject to the internal
constraints of the common law method and to the external constraints
imposed by prevailing ideologies." 0

103. Id.; see also Jay M. Feinman, Practical Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies, 87
MICH. L. REV. 724, 725 (1988).
104. FARBER, supra note 101, at 125.
105. Id. at 126.
106. See Posner, supra note 85, at 838; see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1646 (1987) (defining the
fundamental characteristics of this approach as "a concern for history and context; a desire to
avoid abstracting away the human component in judicial decisionmaking; an appreciation of the
complexity of life; some faith in dialogue and deliberation; a tolerance for ambiguity,
accommodation, and tentativeness, but a skepticism of rigid dichotomies; and an overall
humility").
107. FARBER, supra note 101, at 126.
108. Posner, supra note 85, at 838.
109. FARBER, supra note 101, at 126-27.
110. Id. at 125; see also Posner, supra note 85, at 834-35.
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While this methodology of practical reason contradicts the
policy-neutral, formalistic approach used in the motion-to-dismiss case,
Part III of this Comment will show that the formalistic approach
erroneously and unreflectively presumes that all cases can be decided
through syllogistic reasoning. Before taking up this point, however, it
is helpful to consider the following historic example of pragmatic
decisionmaking.
An Application of Legal Pragmatism
Consider the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown v.
Board of Education."' Although few would quibble with the "correctness" of this decision, its ultimate justification lies not in constitutional text or doctrine, but in fundamental policy considerations that
are outside the realm of legitimate foundationalist concerns.' 1 2 After
all, the language of the Equal Protection Clause is "not obviously
incompatible with a system of segregated schools."' 13 Nor, for that
matter, did the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment actually intend
"to bring about true equality between whites and blacks.""' 4 Finding
nothing in the constitutional text or history that required the holding
in Brown, Judge Richard A. Posner argues that
2.

the ultimate justification for the Brown decision must be sought not
in technical legal materials but in such political and ethical desiderata as improving the positions of blacks; adopting a principle of racial
(and implicitly also religious and ethnic) equality to vindicate the
ideals for which World War II had recently been fought; raising
public consciousness about racial injustice; promoting social peace
through racial harmony; eradicating an institution that was an
embarrassment to America's foreign policy; reducing the social and
political autonomy of the South ("completing the work of the Civil
War"); finding a new institutional role for the Supreme Court to
replace the discredited one of protecting economic liberty; breathing
new life into the equal protection clause."'
That such factors played a role in the Brown decision seems too
obvious to mention.
When cases are decided under foundational doctrines like the
Equal Protection Clause, however, explicit consideration of policy

111.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

112. See FARBER, supra note 101, at 126.
113.
114.

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 303 (1990).
Id.

115. Id. at 304 (footnote omitted).
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matters like these becomes inconsistent with the neutral act of doctrinal
interpretation. However, because the Equal Protection Clause provides
no explicit guidance on the issue of segregated schooling, an honest
decision in Brown would have been impossible without reference to
basic tenants of public policy.
C. How Views Collide: Easy vs. Hard Cases
This Comment adopts the position of the PLS movement that
there are two types of cases, "easy cases" and "hard cases," and that
only the former are appropriately decided under the formalistic
method." 6 The discussion below shows that cases of medical futility
are "hard cases" and argues accordingly that the issue of medical
futility should be decided pragmatically.
The distinction between "hard" and "easy" cases is critical to
understanding the limitations of the formalistic method. An easy case
is one where the applicable law is clear; a hard case, on the other hand,
is one in which a number of rules could arguably be applied."' The
motion-to-dismiss example discussed above is an easy case because the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are unquestionably applicable.
Conversely, Wanglie and Baby K are hard cases because any number
of legal doctrines could conceivably be invoked to decide the issue of
medical futility." 8
Only clearly applicable rules can be "true" in the sense that the
premises of a valid syllogism must be true." 9 If, for example, the
judge in our motion-to-dismiss case could have chosen to apply a
principle of estoppel to bar the defendant's motion, we would be
uncertain that the decision in that case was anything more than the
judge's personal, albeit quite defensible, policy preference. Because the
major premise would be grounded in judicial discretion instead of

116. See Posner, supra note 85, at 832-35. Although not employed by Posner, these terms
are used here for convenient reference to distinctions made by Posner.
117. Id. at 833.
118. Because medical futility is an issue of first impression, courts could choose to resolve
the issue under constitutional or tort law, or under an applicable statute. See Mordarski, supra
note 1, at 765-77 (discussing a variety of potential tort and constitutional approaches available to
courts confronted with the issue of medical futility); see also James A. Gardner, The Ambiguity of
Legal Dreams: A Communitarian Defense of Judicial Restraint, 71 N.C. L. REV. 805, 808-27
(1993) (discussing the discretionary nature of the rationales invoked by courts in deciding whether
to resolve issues under constitutional law and the philosophical and practical difficulties of these
rationales). Innumerable opportunities for further discretion exist because each of these areas has
its own doctrines (e.g., substantive due process, res ipsa loquitur, various maxims of statutory
construction).
119. See Posner, supra note 85, at 833-34.
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binding rules, we would be left with the impression that the formalistic
structure of the opinion was something of a sham, leaving the real basis
of the decision unstated. Thus, syllogistic reasoning is an intellectually
honest basis of decision only in easy cases. 2 °
In cases involving constitutional law, rules are largely the
product of judicial imagination and, hence, cannot be true in the same
way that Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2) is true in our motion-to-dismiss
example. 12' The process of deciding which legal rules or interpretations of those rules to apply in hard cases, though not without
articulable limits, is not a deductive one.122 In deciding common law
and constitutional issues, for example, judges "will often refuse to
have
reexamine legal rules, but the reasons for their refusal need
23
logic."'
of
rule
a
not
is
decisis
stare
logic;
with
do
to
nothing
Similarly, where a legal rule is statutory, as opposed to judgemade, the interpretive process, which is often required to give effect to
such rules, involves far more than simple deduction. 124 Antitrust
law, for example, has changed dramatically in the past century despite
only minor changes in the Sherman Act itself. 2 ' These new interpretations "can be given syllogistic form but [their] nature is not
merely that judges
syllogistic, and attempts to make it appear so show
26
exaggerate the role of logic in legal reasoning."'
III.

ANALYSIS

As discussed in Part I of this Comment, the issue of medical
futility is a complex and multi-faceted one with no clearly applicable
precedent. The methods of formalistic and pragmatic decisionmaking,
as outlined in Part II of this Comment, are relevant to show why

Id.
Some unwarranted invocations of logic may seem transparently and harmlessly
rhetorical, as when a judge says that it would be "illogical" to read a statute requiring
periodic safety inspections of motor vehicles to exclude jeeps. But it is not a completely
harmless locution. Logic has nothing to do with the problem, and judges who do not
realize this may fail to interpret rules properly. Although the dictionary defines a jeep
as a motor vehicle, the issue for the judge is what the legislature meant, and dictionary
meanings are just evidence of that meaning. The interpretive issue can be given
syllogistic form but its nature is not syllogistic, and attempts to make it appear so show
merely that judges exaggerate the role of logic in legal reasoning.
Id. at 832.
121. Id. at 833.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 835.
126. Id. at 832.
120.
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courts should decide the issue of medical futility under tort principles
rather than under constitutional doctrine.
Subpart A, below, analyzes two leading constitutional rights
cases to show how the doctrinal focus of constitutional law results in
a formalistic approach that allows judges to easily ignore significant
and ideologically troublesome questions. Subpart B argues that, in
contrast to constitutional doctrine, the elements of common law tort
provide a viable framework for pragmatically deciding the issue of
medical futility.
A.

Constitutional Formalism

Constitutional decisions in socially volatile cases tend to be
formalistic. As shown below, important policy questions in these types
of cases are often treated as nonexistent because the foundational
theories on which constitutional law is based make their consideration
unnecessary. It is important to note, however, that constitutional law
itself is not to blame. Rather, it is the syllogistic structure of the
opinions in these cases that accounts for the ease with which judges can
avoid such important policy questions.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Roe v. Wade127 and
Bowers v. Hardwick28 illustrate this phenomenon. Although the
issues in these cases are markedly different than the issue of medical
futility, two considerations make them relevant for present purposes.
First, it is the structure of judicial reasoning in each case, not the
factual aspect of the issues, that make these decisions formalistic.
Because a constitutional approach to medical futility would likely rest
on doctrines like substantive due process or the right to privacy, Roe
and Bowers are the best cases at which to look in trying to envision a
constitutional decision of the medical futility issue. Second, the issues
in Roe and Bowers rival the level of controversy generated by the
debate over medical futility: like sexuality and child bearing, death is
an extremely private experience.
1. Roe v. Wade
The Court in Roe invalidated as unconstitutional a statute
criminalizing abortion at any stage of pregnancy except to save the life
of the mother.' 29 Absent from the Court's opinion, however, is any
genuine consideration of whether a fetus is a "life" deserving of the

127.
128.
129.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
410 U.S. at 154.
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same constitutional protections as individuals already born. One need
not disagree with the holding in Roe to see how its formalistic
approach makes consideration of this most controversial question
unnecessary. The Court's reasoning was as follows:
P1
P2
C

All rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are
protected rights to privacy under the Constitution. 30
A right to choose abortion of a nonviable fetus is a right
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. "131
is a constituTherefore, a woman's right to an abortion
132
tionally protected right to privacy.

At first, this explication of the Roe opinion seems overly simplistic.
Given the lengthy historical discussion of abortion presented by Justice
Blackmun,133 the decision in Roe would appear to rest on far more
than a simple syllogism.
The decision in Roe, however, rests solely on the "ordered
34
liberty" concept of due process announced in Palko v. Connecticut,
and thus makes the volatile question of whether a fetus is a life legally
irrelevant. 31 While the application of the Palko rule is buttressed by
careful examination of both ancient and contemporary views on
abortion, the decision to restrict the constitutional meaning of "person"
to include only postnatal human life lacks a clear foundation.'3 6 The

130.
131.

Id. at 152.
Id. at 154.

132. Id.
133. Id. at 129-47.
134. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
135. This difficult ethical and scientific question-one that is a cornerstone of public debate
over abortion-is unnecessary to confront under Justice Blackmun's historical approach to
"ordered liberty" analysis because it focuses on the legal history of abortion, not the volatile
questions of public debate. Justice Blackmun's historical approach is clear throughout the
majority opinion, most notably when he reaches the conclusion that "at common law, at the time
of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century,
abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under most [statutes in effect at the time Roe was
decided]." Roe, 410 U.S. at 140. By observing how this approach made considerations of the
most controversial dimensions of the abortion issue unnecessary, this Comment does not suggest
this approach was necessarily the wrong one for the Court to follow. Instead, the focus here is
solely on the implications of approaching medical futility in this manner. Unlike the abortion
issue, medical futility is a new and seldom discussed issue, which no legislature has explicitly
addressed. It is thus arguably more important with medical futility than with abortion that a
judicial decision on the issue have the effect of opening our eyes.
136. In defining person to mean only postnatal life, the Court looked to how the word was
used in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment; in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses; in
the listing of qualifications to hold legislative office, art. I, § 2, cl.2, and § 3, cl.3; in the
Apportionment Clause, art. 1, § 2, cl.3; in the Migration and Importation provision, art. I, § 9,
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Court's argument that this limited view is required by the various uses
of the word "person" throughout the Constitution"' is specious. In
contrast to this narrow view, the opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education employed a broad reading of the constitutional text that
accounted for modern conceptions of equality,"' even when those
conceptions were perhaps at odds with the original intent of the
Framers.'39 Thus, the strict approach taken by the Roe Court in
defining "person" represents nothing more than the choice of one
method of constitutional construction over another equally valid
method.
Freed from the task of deciding when life begins by its
application of the Palko rule, the Court was able to decide Roe
40
according to the familiar pattern of other privacy rights cases,1 the
pattern represented by the above syllogism. Although the Court's
decision to employ this method was not required by the Constitution,
compared to a rule that narrowly defines person, the settled principle
of "ordered liberty" on which the Court's decision rests is less
discretionary. Regardless of how well settled this principle is, however,
it cannot be syllogistically true in the same way that the premise "all
answers are ordered pleadings under Rule 7(a)" was true in the
motion-to-dismiss example in Part II. The Court in Roe was, after all,
free to announce a new test to be used in deciding fundamental rights
cases. The fact that "stare decisis" or other maxims of judicial policy
can be used to support the continued application of the "ordered
liberty" test makes it a defensible rule, but not a "true" one in the
sense that Rule 7(a) is the true rule for judges to apply in deciding
procedural disputes.
2.

Bowers v. Hardwick

The issue in Bowers v. Hardwick' was whether a Georgia
statute criminalizing sodomy violated the fundamental rights of
homosexuals. 4 2 In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held
that the Georgia statute did not violate the fundamental rights of

cl. 1; in the Emolument Clause, art. 1, § 9, cl. 8; and in several other provisions. Roe, 410 U.S.
at 157.
137. Id. at 158.
138. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
141. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
142. Id. at 187-88. The Georgia statute at issue was Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (1984).
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homosexuals because the Constitution does not confer a fundamental
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. 43 The syllogism upon
which the Court's holding rested was as follows:
P1

P2

C

All rights protected under the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution are rights so "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" that "neither liberty 44or justice would
exist if [those rights] were sacrificed.'
A right to homosexual sodomy is not a right so "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" such that "neither
liberty or justice would exist" in its absence.'
Therefore, the rights protected by the Due Process
Clause do not include a right to homosexual sodomy.146

The major premise (P1)-the Palko v. Connecticut formulation of
"ordered liberty"'-is the law of the case, and its validity is presumed. The fact-specific minor premise (P2), which appears to be a
mere application of P1, is supported by the Court's discussion of this
country's historical proscription against homosexual sodomy. 4
The problem with this syllogism is not its logical validity
(clearly, the premises require the conclusion), but rather the fact that
its premises cannot be labeled true or false in any meaningful sense.
Recall that in a valid syllogism, the truth of the premises guarantees
the truth of the conclusion. 49 In the Bowers syllogism, therefore, the
truth of P1 and P2 is required for the conclusion to be true. But who
is to say whether the "ordered liberty" concept of due process is indeed
the "true" one? While the obvious answer-the Supreme Court!-is
right in a pejorative sense, it does nothing to explain the logical basis
of the holding in Bowers. The rule that only rights implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty are protected by due process cannot be true
in the same way that the premises in a valid syllogism are true. If, as
in Bowers, the legal rule expressed in the major premise-the Palko
rule-is a mere application of stare decisis, the conclusion is not "true"
in the sense that it is logically required by the premises. Instead, the
conclusion is "true" only insofar as the judge's decision to adhere to

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-93.
Id. at 191-92.
Id.
Id. at 192.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-93 (providing historical background of state sodomy laws).
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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Such reasoning is illusory: the form
stare decisis is "correct."
promises a conclusion deduced from true premises, but the conclusion
offered is instead merely a defensible exercise of judicial discretion.
Only by assuming that the "ordered liberty" test applies does
the Bowers Court avoid addressing the difficult questions that nonjudges would surely ask in deciding whether laws against homosexual
practices are constitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice White
pays lip service to general principles of judicial restraint, ° but he
does not explain the stringent application of these principles in light of
their more relaxed role in other landmark decisions involving fundamental rights. While arguments about the limited role of the judiciary
are not necessarily without merit, they do not make Palko "true" in the
sense that the Federal Rules were true in the civil procedure case
discussed earlier.
The Court's formalistic approach enabled it to ignore the
socially divisive issues that come to mind in considering whether
constitutional protections should be extended to include a right to
engage in sexual relations with members of the same sex. These issues
include obvious questions, such as whether recognizing a right to
engage in homosexual activity would undermine traditional family
structures or, on the other end of the ideological spectrum, whether
such a right would in fact enhance these structures by reducing the ill
effects of pervasive social stigma."' These policy questions are
irrelevant under Justice White's formalistic approach, however, because
the decision to apply a narrow, historically based reading of Palko
effectively disposes of the case. The discretionary nature of this
decision is apparent when we recall that in Brown the Court opted for
a broader and less historically based reading of the Due Process
Clause.5 2
The absence of demonstrably true premises in both Bowers and
Roe is problematic not because logic is the only acceptable basis for the
decision, but because the structure of the decision purports to rest on
logic. Because it offers judges numerous doctrinal bases for avoiding
tough decisions, the federal constitution is an easy thing to hide
behind. Like the issues of abortion and homosexual sodomy, medical
futility is not directly addressed in the Constitution. Neither does the
Constitution require the "ordered liberty" concept of due process.
Thus, any decision to make the difficult questions raised by the issue

150.
151.
152.

Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92, 194-95.
See, e.g., Beverly Balos, Book Review, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 317, 319 (1991).
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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legally irrelevant can reflect nothing more than a desire to avoid
confronting them.
B.

Pragmatismand the Elements of a Tort

Judges have considerable discretion in choosing the legal
doctrine to be used in deciding the issue of medical futility.153 Three
considerations support the argument that this discretion should be
exercised in favor of deciding medical futility under common law tort
principles. First, the elements of a tort--duty, breach, causation, and
damage' 4 -do more to encompass the kinds of difficult policy
questions raised by the issue of medical futility than the confined
discussion of history on which the opinions in Roe and Bowers
purportedly rest.
Second, the discussion about duty of care that a tort approach
would require is exactly the sort of discussion that is needed in the area
of medical futility. As discussed in Part I, legislators and judges alike
have avoided confronting this issue at the expense of certainty in a vital
area of medical rights. A judicial decision on whether a physician has
a duty to provide life-sustaining treatment in cases of medical futility
if the treatment does not comport with the standards of reasonableness
would invariably generate the discourse needed to trigger legislative
response.
In contrast, constitutional pronouncements are not as effective
in generating discourse because the process of constitutional interpretation is commonly viewed as something completely distinct from other
policy-based decisions.'

This sense of reverence for constitutional

pronouncements often chills legislative action as to social issues
entwined with constitutionally based decisions.
Similarly, it may seem less shocking to say that the Constitution does or does not support a right to medically futile treatment than
to say whether or not such a right is reasonable. But we should be
shocked by the questions raised by the current practice of terminating
and withholding life-sustaining medical treatments on the ground that
they are "nonbeneficial" and hence "medically futile." While it is true

153. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. Although the discretion to apply tort law
would not exist if the parties before the court failed to assert tortious arguments, this Comment
is premised on the view that, in the age of liberal pleading, parties to a futility dispute would
surely assert both constitutional and common law tort arguments.
154.

See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164

(5th ed. 1984).
155. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 118, at 833-37 (discussing how, more than any other
type of case, constitutional cases pit disparate social visions against each other).
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that constitutional pronouncements pit disparate social visions against
one another more than any other legal ruling,"5 6 constitutional
decisions tend to moot the crucial questions on which these visions so
The medical futility issue involves complex ecosharply differ.'
nomic and moral questions about resource allocation, as well as
questions about the limits of physician authority." 8 To ensure that
these crucial questions are not ignored as the similarly tough questions
were in Roe and Bowers, courts should decide the issue of medical
futility under tort principles. Although the use of tort principles would
be no guarantee that these questions would be openly confronted, tort
law's overarching focus on reasonableness will do more to keep these
types of questions central than the doctrinal focus commonly used in
constitutional decisions of similarly volatile issues.1" 9
Finally, tort law is less conducive to legal formalism than is
constitutional law. While interpretations of constitutional text and
doctrine easily take the form of rules (e.g., the "ordered liberty test"60
used in Roe and Bowers) that can be stated as syllogistic premises,
articulations of what is reasonable tend to be more context specific and,
161
thus, less easily stated as general propositions. In Helling v. Carey,
for example, the Washington Supreme Court held that "reasonable
prudence" required ophthalmologists to administer a simple, inexpensive glaucoma test to all patients regardless of their age. 16' Although
the issue raised in Helling-the standard of care for ophthalmologists-is not nearly as controversial as the issue of medical futility, the
policy considerations the court used in deciding it illustrate how tort
law makes such considerations central to legal analysis. 163 Similarly,
in the classic case of The TJ. Hooper,164 Judge Learned Hand applied

156. See id. at 841-43 (arguing that the only genuine basis for the policy of constitutional
restraint-refusing to decide an issue under the Constitution where other grounds exist-is that
the Constitution is seen as embodying "fundamental values," thus giving constitutional decisions
the inevitable effect of privileging one social vision over another).
157. See supra notes 136, 152 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 10, 51 and accompanying text.
159. This Comment does not take the position that courts are better suited than legislative
bodies to make policy-based decisions, but rather seeks to show that policy-neutral decisionmaking
is, in some cases, incompatible with intellectually honest decisionmaking. See supra note 121.
The position taken here is simply that, as far as the issue of medical futility is concerned, the cost
of sacrificing honesty for neutrality is unacceptable.
160. See supra notes 131, 132, 145, 146 and accompanying text.
161. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
162. Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.
163. The Helling court grounded its holding on the test's minimal cost, overall effectiveness,
and considerable preventative benefits. Id. at 518, 519 P.2d at 983.
164. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
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cost-benefit analysis in holding that the standard of care for tugboat
masters required them to equip their tugs with radios. 6 ' Like the
decision in Helling, the decision in The T.J. Hooper illustrates how tort
law's focus on determining reasonableness encourages nonformalistic
decisionmaking that takes account of practical questions.
When courts free themselves from explaining the bases of
discretionary rules by using such rules as syllogistic premises, however,
the resulting conclusion is not only logically invalid, it is intellectually
dishonest.'66 The process of interpreting and applying legal rules in
hard cases is not a simple deductive one;' 67 to pretend that it is by
framing common law and constitutional rules as syllogistic premises
leaves the real bases of decision in these cases unstated. In medical
futility cases, the potential ramifications of either permitting or denying
physicians the authority to terminate life-sustaining treatments are too
severe to indulge in this deception any longer, however comforting it
may be.
A variety of existing common law torts could be updated to
address the issue of medical futility.'68 For example, a negligence
model would require proof of the following three elements: (1) the
existence of a legal duty to the person harmed; (2) the breach of that
duty by the defendant; and (3) damage to the plaintiff caused by the
breach.' 69 "In a case in which a patient is dependent on a life
support system, the physician would have a duty to act as a reasonable
physician would act in dealing with that patient."' 7 ° Where the
physician terminates life support against the wishes of the family, proof
by the family that the physician's decision was unreasonable would
show that the physician breached his or her "duty to the patient to act
with due care, and that [the] breach was the proximate cause of the
If the decision was also shown to be reckless,
plaintiffs death."''
the physician could be liable for punitive7 2damages in addition to
compensatory damages for wrongful death.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See id. at 739.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
Mordarski, supra note 1, at 765-71.
Id. at 766.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 765.
Id.
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CONCLUSION

Medical futility is a complex issue that implicates profound
moral, ethical, and economic questions. When a physician concludes
that a life-sustaining treatment is medically futile, he or she may seek
to terminate such treatment regardless of the wishes of the patient or
the patient's family. Although the connotations of the term "medical
futility" are clinical and scientific, a determination that life-sustaining
treatments should be withheld or terminated represents a policy
decision, not a medical decision.
In deciding the issue of medical futility, judges should choose
a legal framework that allows their decision to center on the difficult
moral, ethical, and economic questions inherent in the issue. As
shown in Part II, issues of policy cannot honestly be separated from
issues of law in hard cases. While applying a formalistic constitutional
model, as was applied in Roe and Bowers, would likely limit judicial
inquiry to whether an absolute duty to preserve life at all costs is
required by the nebulous concept of "ordered liberty," use of a tort
model would encourage judges and legislatures to honestly confront the
difficult policy questions that medical futility raises. As shown in Part
III, tort law's overarching focus on reasonableness keeps these types of
questions central, while the formalistic model common to constitutional
decisions makes such questions legally irrelevant.
There is currently no statutory or decisional law addressing the
issue of medical futility. Society in general, and public officials in
particular, are reluctant to directly confront this increasingly important
and problematic issue. For this reason, it is especially important that
courts decide the issue of medical futility in a manner that deals
directly with the troublesome questions that are so tempting to avoid.
Asking whether it is reasonable for physicians to terminate or withhold
life-sustaining treatments is more consistent with this goal than asking
whether such a practice is constitutional.

